The Monroe Doctrine

The Monroe Doctrine Before the administration of President Monroe there grew up in the United States a fixed determination that this country should not allow, under any pretext whatever, territorial aggrandizement on this western continent by any European country. From certain declarations on the subject by him, this settled policy became known as the Monroe Doctrine.

558 IMPROVEMENT ERA By what authority, it is often asked, has the United States made itself the guardian of the continent of which it forms but a fractional part. The principle of guardianship is as old as the human race. It is the principle by which the strong protects the weak it is a humane relationship, helpful as a rule to those who ;

need protection. The small countries to the south of us were in a state of tutelage. Whatever they thought of their own powers and stability, history has shown their infantile character, their condition as wards. Someone must act as guardian. In the case of individuals the court appoints ; in case of nations they become self-appointive, and act through the general concensus of international opinion. The best qualified protector of these small countries was the United States. European countries conceded to us the responsibility of Monroe Doctrine. There was the important task set forth in the another, and perhaps more cogent reason why we should assume the role of protector. It is the law of self-preservation. The conquest of South and Central American countries by the nations of Europe would compel the United States to adopt the same means of defense that European countries adopted. We should be compelled to keep large standing armies and navies. Without a naval base on this continent the countries of Europe would never be a great menace to us at sea. Our isolation thus became to us an economical advantage which we in our own self interest could not afford to abandon. The Monroe Doctrine thus came to be both a duty and a necessity. To grant Japan a coaling station on the coast of Mexico would come within the scope of the Monroe Doctrine. It is not a question of likely hostility, but one of possible hostility. Japan was the logical guardian of Korea, and all other nations acceded to Japan's self-appointment. Another question is often mooted. By our acquisition of the Philippines do we lose our justification for the Monroe Doctrine? If we go to the eastern hemisphere for dominion, why should any nation of the eastern hemisphere not come to the western hemisphere for dominion? There would be the strongest reasons for objection to our assumption of dominion in any part of Europe. Those reasons do not apply to Asia or the islands of the Pacific, except in such wards as naturally fall to the protectorship of Japan and of cer-

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tain European countries. The doctrine has reference chiefly to the foreign relationship of Europe to our neighbors on the south. We do not assume guardianship in the domestic regulations of any of these countries, and yet it is easy to imagine conditions in these small countries which would require us to act in matters of internal affairs. It is not unlikely that the use of the Panama canal will call forth some more direct interference with their domestic affairs. We have never traded extensively with South or Central American countries, and their petty revolutions and domestic disturbances have not been detrimental to us. We have not become their creditors, and have had no debts to collect from them. The Pan-American Congresses have been organized with a view to more intimate relations with the south, and to an enlargement of our trade with these neighbors. Capital from the United States is pushing its way more and more to the south, and we shall hereafter be more concerned about domestic troubles in

those countries than we have been. We may therefore look for a broadened and more intensified interpretation of that doctrine in the future. Joseph M. Tanner.