How Do We Think?

Vol. I. JUNE, 1897. No. 8. HOW DO WE THINK? BY W. H. LAMASTER. Could we think without a language? That question has not as yet been definitely settled. What is thought? Some say that it is language minus sound. But who knows that it is? Does the dog think? Prof. Max Muller and others say that the dog does not, and why? Because they say that the dog has no language. What is language? We are told that it is thought plus sound. Granting that it is, is there not sound in the bark of a dog? The answer is, yes; but is it of such a character which conveys any kind of intelligence? The dog might answer that question much better than we could ourselves. Language is again defined as articulated words; and if so, who knows but that the neighing of the horse, the lowing of the ox, and the barking of the dog are not articulated words to the ears of the horse, the ox, and the dog families? Who can say but that each type of the brute creation does not recognize with its own kind a distinction of vocal sounds? And if each type of such creation does, may there not be in the neighing of a horse, the lowing of an ox, and the barking of a dog, not only a sound, but articulated words? If there are, certainly then the brute creation thinks as well as man. 41

54C IMPROVEMENT ERA. It will not be denied that there is always to be seen a very close connection between the science of language and the science of thought, and that being true, we must therefore think more or less in words. As little as we can "reckon without actual or disguised numerals," says Prof. Max Muller, "can we reason without actual or disguised words." Hence he argues that we, even as human beings, can think only in words. But might we not ask, does the new-born babe think? Certainly it cannot if it can only think in words. But does not the new-born babe realize both pleasure and pain? Cer- tainly it does; and therefore it must think, and do so also, without either actual or disguised words. The Duke of Argyll, in his scholarly work on "The Reign of Law," says of the mind that it "stands in pre-estab- lished relations to things around it—bound to them by the in- finite adjustments which may be called external correlations of growth;" and he argues "that out of these relations it is not itself nor does its powers possess the materials whereon to work." Admitting his premises, and also admitting that out of such relations with external things, the mind would possess no powers whatever to work, still, standing though as it does in its pre-established relations to these same external things, it might nevertheless have all the powers of thought and exercise them minus a language. We certainly must study the mind and weigh and measure its powers and its capacities, if at all, as we would anything else —only in the concrete. Even the subject of mind itself can- not be considered by us as an abstract proposition; we must think, if at all, by relations, and so, therefore, the outside world is but an auxiliary power, as it were, to the one of our minds, in the exercise of thought. There is a difference in the modes of thinking, as there is in anything else. Some of our thoughts are also more com- plex than are others. The child's thoughts we call simple, and why? Because its mind has not as yet reached that higher plane of development of those of more mature years. Because one may not have the power of discernment or of formulating ideas which we would call intelligent, is cer- tainly no good reason why he or she does not think. The

HOW DO WE THINK? 547 idiot may be unable to think intelligently; and yet we cannot say of him that he does not think. That we might be the more able to answer the question, "How do we think?" we should understand the more clearly than we now seem to do the physics and the chemistry of mind. The truth is, we as yet know but little whatever con- cerning the laws which govern and control our minds; what progress has even science made in analyzing the human mind? Science may call the mind a force, an intelligent motor, or even the thinking part of man; and still what more do we know of its real powers and capacities than we did before? We certainly must agree with Maudsley when he says, that its real functions are as yet beyond our deepest research. Now we should not forget that even human speech itself is an art, and like every other art it must be first acquired be- fore it can be used. The only natural language that man has, if any at all, is a cry—an inarticulate sound of the vocal organs. It is therefore by reason of our learning how to articulate certain vocal sounds and to carve and to mould them into words that we, as human beings, ever come to possess anything like a language. Ideas, we should remem- ber, may be conveyed by signs and by gestures; and who can say but all language might have been pantomimic instead of vocal? But if it was of that character, would it not have been of about equal force in aiding us to think as any articu- lated form of speech? The only purpose of human speech is to record and to communicate thoughts; without either words, signs or gest- ures of some kind, our thoughts could be of little or no value to us. It is only because of our power to convey and to com- municate our thoughts through intelligent channels of some kind which go to constitute us rational beings It is man's thoughts, their character and force, and his power of com- municating them in an intelligent manner which crowns him the lord of creation. We have not as yet, though, answered the question, "How do we think?" We may say of our minds that they think; but why or how do they think? It is no answer to say that, because all our ideas come from sensation and reflection,

548 IMPROVEMENT ERA. therefore, we think, for the reason that whatever may be the nature or the source of our thoughts they are still under some law; and that law we do not as yet thoroughly understand. If we understood the laws of mind we could then be the more able to say why and how we think. Leibnitz believed and argued that every particle of matter, even to the atom, is not only endowed with the power of thought, but also has a will of its own, and hence a perception of its own individual exis- tence and its particular place in Nature. He even maintained, with much force and ability, that the minutest particle of matter, whether organized or not, contains a world of lives, actualities, souls; with him there was no such thing as dead matter. He even regarded what is called death as only another form of life, one also of mind, thought, will. Des- cartes and his school of philosophy, on the other hand, held what we call life (the life that is seen in its organized forms as in man) to be but a higher force, and in only organized forms can it exist, so, therefore, with Descartes only organized beings of any kind have minds, souls, or wills. If it be true, then, that mind is one of the endowments of matter, even in its organized forms; and one of its functions is that of thinking, it cannot be denied that it will think inde- pendently of words actually spoken or disguised. Is it to be supposed that, before the invention of words, men did not think? Words themselves presuppose some kind of thought; in fact, words are the natural and legitimate offspring of thought. Would one born without either the sense of hear- ing or of sight not think? In the case.of Laura Bridgman, the blind deaf-mute, are we to believe that before she was taught to both read and write, and before she even knew the use or the meaning of words, she did not think? Why or how we think is therefore not a thing to be acquired or learned, unless it be the more intelligently, but is one of the powers of the mind, and is as natural as is the mind itself. We are told, though, that we think only in concepts and therefore can only think in words. If one born both blind and deaf thinks, and does so without words, does not such a one think in concepts? Is there not in such a one's mind a concept—a mental image, as it were, photographed on his or

HOW DO WE THINK? 549 her brain, when thinking, at least of himself or of herself? Would there not be a concept of some kind in such a one's mind when hungry, thirsty or cold, and one, too, independent of words? In every such mental energy, when exerted, it cer- tainly would not be merely a reflex action of the brain, but one common to the natural functions and powers of the mind; therefore the mind itself, it must be conceded, makes its own conditions for thinking; and when the brain, which is its natural organ, is in a healthy and normal condition, it will think independently of either words, signs or gestures. THE FLIGHT OF THE ARROW. The life of man Is an arrow's flight, Out of darkness Into light, And out of light Into darkness again: Perhaps to pleasure, Perhaps to pain! There must be Something, Above, or below; Somewhere unseen, A mighty Bow, A hand that tires not, A sleepless Eye That sees the arrows Fly, and fly; One who knows Why we live—and die. Anon.