European Diplomacy

EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY.

BY PROFESSOR JOSEPH M. TANNER, PRESIDENT OF AGRICULTURAL COLLEGE, LOGAN, UTAH.

European diplomacy is always the most interesting in that locality where the interests of the European powers conflict or would be likely to create conflicting interests. The spot may be a little insignificant island; it may be an unimportant kingdom in itself; it may be some province; the importance of the locality always depending upon the vantage ground that it may appear to have for any one of the great powers. Jealousy is largely the source of international diplomacy. Lately it centered in Greece, a kingdom of itself unimportant, whose affairs, but for the interest that the rest of Europe is taking in them, would be of little consequence to us and would awaken but little interest throughout the world.

A war has been going on between Greece and Turkey, the results of which are fully known to the world. As a matter of military science it has practically no importance; but it has a value to the student of history in the fact that around this little kingdom the war ships of the great nation hover, and the ministers of various countries are discussing the results of the war. Judging from the newspaper articles that one reads, there is almost universal disappointment. Throughout all Christian countries there has been a general wish that the Greeks might be successful; and yet, in the face of this universal sympathy for their cause, the governing powers, the executive departments of all these Christian countries that are occupied now in the adjustment of the question, reverse the public will and ignore the public sympathy.

There have been some substantial reasons for this, for

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most of the countries interested are governed largely by public sentiment. But there are two reasons why public opinion does not control the actions of the ministers of foreign affairs of the leading powers. In the first place, some of the countries which have most to do in maintaining the balance of power in Europe, are uncontrolled by popular opinion, and in some public opinion is very weak, at any rate, fails to be a controlling factor. Europe must always count on Russia. France courted and it is very generally understood that she at last obtained an alliance with that country. Germany courts friendship, and Austria maintains a position noncommittal, because Austrian and Russian interests may conflict. So that, when a statesman of France comes to the consideration of a question like that of the Orient, he must be divided in his judgments and decisions between popular demands and the wishes of Russia.

In the second place, public opinion is not so far-reaching in European countries in matters of foreign relations as in this country. It may evoke criticism, but it has no determined purpose as it has in local affairs. And again, those who have to deal with these questions find obstacles with which the masses of the people are unfamiliar. It is one thing to criticize, but quite another to remove the causes of criticism. Again, statesmen of Europe recognize the fact that in the discussion of the Eastern question a vast amount of religious prejudice has been brought to bear. These prejudices intuitively incline men always to take the side of the Christian as against the Moslem, and it very frequently happens that this sympathy sets aside all considerations of justice as between man and man.

Greece, without cause, created dissatisfaction in Crete and incited a rebellion, and its unjust course became so manifest to the nations that the great powers interfered; and because of this interference, and this solely, and to force the great powers into an awkward and dangerous position, Greece began war against Turkey. It had no justification, (except to gratify national vanity and resent the action of the great powers in their interference with Crete). That happened which everybody expected — the Greeks were defeated. They were

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no match for the Turks; in the first place, they were unprepared for war; in the second place, they were too small in numbers, and in the third place, Turkey has a well disciplined army, officered, to a great extent, by Germans. Turkey made its demands. It asked for Thessaly and a war indemnity in money. Of course the powers would never grant Turkey the right to enlarge her national domains, especially on the European side of the Bosphorus. A money indemnity, therefore, was the only compensation for which the Sultan could hope. But there are serious difficulties in the way of obtaining this.

The Greeks are in debt, and it is difficult to secure a loan, perhaps impossible to secure any important loan and maintain an independent control of their finances and all the resources of government revenue. The proposition has been made, and is now discussed among the great powers, to make the loan to Greece and assume control of certain revenues to be collected by an international committee, who would thus become directly identified with the local and governmental affairs of the little kingdom, a most humiliating position for Greece to find herself in. This might be adopted as it was adopted in Egypt; but the great powers remembering how successful England was in her control and final absorption of all Egyptian revenues, have become fearful of the results.

But just at present an obstacle greater than the fear of the great powers has presented itself. Greece has an indebtedness of $140,000,000, $120,000,000 of which is due Germany. The Germans very naturally demand that before the revenues are turned over into the channel of the new obligations, which the indemnit}' to Turkey demands, the indebtedness to Germany be first paid off. That means that this international commission would not only have to provide out of the revenues the demands of the Turkish war indemnity, hut also the past debts incurred by loans made in Germany.

But the question has been repeatedly asked, and in a most flippant manner, why not wipe out the Turkish power, especially in Europe, and settle this whole question? European Turkey cannot be wiped out of existence. It can onl}'^ be transferred. Some kind of a government must exist there.

That government must be conducted either by the people within the country themselves, or it must be controlled by foreign governments. It may seem a paradox, yet it is nevertheless true, that among the many nationalties in the Orient, there are perhaps none that would not prefer that the Turks remain in control of that country rather than see it pass into the hands of the European powers. If the Greeks could control themselves, they would not object to their own control; neither would the Armenians. But the fact is that among the Greeks, Jews and Moslems they all prefer the rule of the Turks to that of any other people in Turkey. Greece could not govern; neither could Armenia, and it would be absurd to speak of a control of that country by the Jews. What then remains, if the country is to be controlled by the people who live in it? There is but one answer and that is conclusive — Turkish rule. The Turks are without question the most capable of administering the affairs of the country, and so far as every man is allowed his own independence, his religion and the privilege of attending to his own affairs, there is no freer country in the world.

Do the people of that country, then, want its administration carried on by foreigners? This must be an expediency, and it is a very doubtful one. Besides, if it is to be controlled by some foreign nation, what nation shall it be? England, Austria, or Russia? The problem is difficult. It is not a theory, it is not a question of abstract principle; it is a condition, the difficulty of which has no parallel in the history of the world. True enough, it has been said, that the best solution perhaps that could be made would be that of a partition, dividing the country up chiefly between Russia, Austria and England; but there could be no division, no natural division, no practicable division, unless most of the country were given to Russia and Austria, Russia receiving the greatest part of it. The position which Russia occupies naturally places her claims at the top of the list. Austria, who would be Russia's chief competitor in the distribution, hesitates. The population of that country is already a conglomerate one, and the great variety of nationalties within the Austrian domains is a source of great trouble to the gov-

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ernment as it is. Besides, between Austria and the country which it would annex in case of division, lie Bulgaria and Servia; Bosnia and Herzegovnia could be disposed of, but Austria would need also to make her empire properly compact, and secure for the administration of governmental affairs, to include both Bulgaria and Servia. To this Russia, of course, could not consent.

Thus it will be seen that from whatever point of view you approach the problem of the partition of the Turkish empire, the obstacles are so numerous and so difficult as not only to perplex but to baffle the skill of statesmanship.

These conditions give assurance of life to the Turkish empire. But there are other reasons why so much vitality has been found within the dominion of the Sultan; and there are reasons, too, why his dominions may increase in strength. With the Turkish empire it is not a question of decadence on moral grounds, as it was in the days of Rome. As a rule, the Moslems are honest and virtuous. In these qualities they compare well with the Christians of their empire. But they are an unprogressive people. The immense resources of their country lie dormant; the government has not adequate means at its command, and the continuation of the empire depends largely upon its material progress. No one can say how long that empire might not last if these resources could be properly developed. Turkey is in a better financial condition today than it has been perhaps for centuries. Its revenues are improved. Its present monarch is a man of great sagacity, an indomitable worker, and said by those who have been in a position to know, to be one of the foremost statesmen of Europe; and while he lives it is not too much to say that Turkey will continue to maintain her own, if not increase her prestige among the nations of Europe, as she appears to be doing at the present time.

Turkey, therefore, seems to depend much upon the character of her rulers and the improvement of her revenues. And civilization is touching Turkey. This influence, and the development of the material resources of that country, will continue to encourage more and more to the advancement of the speculative spirit which in time must reach its inhabitants.

There is at this time an organization of young Turks in Paris, young Turks who have been educated in European cities, mostly in Paris, and who have become imbued with the ideas of Christian civilization. This organization is lending all its efforts to national reform. The influence of these young Turks over the present Sultan, although he opposes them and would gladly see them completely defeated if not put to death as traitors to their country, is very potent. Their publications, in spite of all censorship, reach many of the young Turks at Constantinople. Of course no one can say what Abdul Hamid's successor may be. If he should be rash and profligate, he would precipitate a war. At present the "sick man" seems to have taken a new lease of life. In the difficulties with Greece he has shown great skill and political foresight. The results have redounded to his good.

And there are those who believe that the Turk is capable of reformation and hold that the individual qualities of that nation give promise of progress and stability. It must be remembered that education in the last twenty years has made greater progress in the empire than in any preceding two centuries. There is certainly vigor in the national life. There is purpose and determination in the Turkish character when once the temper of the Turk has been aroused. What the Turk needs now very badly is money. It would give him a new lease of national life and perhaps a long one. If he secures his indemnity, as it seems most likely now, he would be greatly aided thereby; and if he can sell Palestine at a good figure, no one can say what solidity he might thereby be able to give to the nation. Palestine is of no value to the Turk as a matter of revenue. It is a source of religious contention. There are no Turks in the country, and for the turbulent Arabs that live there he has but little sympathy. If a Turk can overcome his religious scruples about Palestine, he perhaps would find no difi&culty in disposing of it to the Jews, who seem just now to be agitating its purchase. Then again, the question of its sale would call forth European diplomacy, and it might become as difficult as its conquest by arms.

Turkey is and has been since 1870 a most fruitful source for discussion and differences in European diplomacy. All