Probable Moral Effects of the War

Probable Moral Effects of the War"

By Dr. Milton Bennion, of the University of Utah

We cannot discuss with profit the probable moral effects of the war without first making clear what we mean by "moral." Is morality a thing simply to be admired when it appears, like the beauty of a rose; or is there an element in our judgment of morality that is essentially different from our judgment of beauty? Is the present European war a phenomenon as natural and inevitable as the production of thorns on the wild cactus under a summer sky? Or is there an element in it that might have been subject to human control? These questions have been discussed under various philosophical and theological terms for more than two thousand years, and still there is no universally accepted answer. Is it then futile to try to solve these questions of determinism and indeterminism, necessity and free will, predestination and human free agency? Whether or not we care for such metaphysical discussion, every intelligent person is forced, in practice, to assume some sort of answer as a basis of judgment and social conduct. If man's conduct is determined wholly by his invironment and his heredity, and his heredity is determined wholly by past environment, and this determinism applies likewise to every creature and every object in nature; then, it appears that whatever happens is predetermined from the beginning. I shall not discuss the relation of this view to theological opinions that hav? been current from St. Augustine to the present time. Let us consider the matter only from the standpoint of philosophy and science. Pantheistic philosophy has generally been deterministic. Whatever is must of necessity be as it is. Evil is only good in process of becoming. From the standpoint of the Infinite there is no evil. "It is the action of an uninstructed person to reproach others for his own misfortunes; of one entering upon instruction, to reproach himself; and of one perfectly instructed, to reproach neither others nor himself," says Epictetu> the Roman Stoic philosopher. Materialistic philosophy leads, from a different starting point, to the same general conclusion; but the determinism is, in this case, more explicitly external. The mechanical view of

*Lecture given in the University of Utah Extension Course, December 9, 1914.

216 IMPROVEMENT ERA

the world generally regards each object or creature as determined by everything else in the universe, but as having no power of self-determination. A typical example of this is the usual form of statement of the law of gravitation: "Every particle of matter in the universe attracts every other particle," etc. It should be noted that there is no proof of the metaphysical assumption implied in this form of statement of the law, which might be revised so as to attribute to matter the power of selfdetermination with the same definite relations to the respective masses and distances of other particles of matter. The natural scientist, as such, need not be concerned with this metaphysical distinction, as the facts and calculations remain the same. The moral philosopher is obliged to give attention, however, when this assumption of the physicist is accepted as a demonstrated fact and extended to man and society. It does, then, make a difference in some of our moral judgments. If the theory of external determinism is accepted, the logical consequence is that the world of human life is as much a passing show as is the growth of timber in the primeval forest. It happens only that we are apart of the show, playing parts determined for us wholly, in the ultimate analysis, by physical nature. Our judgments of morality in individuals and nations must, then, be of the same order as our judgments of the magnificence or the insignificance of the native pine tree or the sage brush. That everything within our experience is influenced, more or less, by things, external to us there can be no doubt; but this does not prove that everything is thus wholly determined, neither does this or any other fact prove that a knowledge of all that is and has beei would reveal fully all that is yet to be. In the course of evolution new characteristics are constantly appearing. According to Herbert Spencer's definition of evolution all the complexities of the world have thus appeared out of a primitive substance that was homogeneous in structure and function. Can anyone conceive how, on the theory of external determinism such a development could be possible. Must there not have been in this primitive substance a power of self-differentiation, of producing new characteristics; or must there not have been a power different from this homogeneous substance by which varying characteristics were developed? Theologians may make the latter assumption and philosophers of nature the former with, it seems to me, a greater show of reason than that exhibited by materialists in upholding the theory of external, mechanical determinism. Let us consider that philosophy in which self-determinism becomes a factor in development. If the primitive substance of the world had within itself a limited power of self-determination and differentiation, it is at least conceivable how new character-

MORAL EFFECTS OF THE WAR 217

might appear out of a homogeneous mass, and how thus istics a complex world might arise in which external influence might become a potent factor in further progress, but not the sole factor. Science postulates order in the universe. The facts of nature can be reduced to scientific principles upon no other assumption. This order may, however, come from within, as well as from without. Science postulates that whenever a new characteristic appears it will behave in the same way under the same conditions. Thus in the recurrence of phenomena already experienced, science can predict such phenomena, where all the conditions are known. Science cannot, however, predict the nature of phenomena that are absolutely new in experience; but that such new phenomena do appear in the course of evolution is also a postulate of science in the larger sense, and an undisputed fact of experience. Applying this to the moral life of men and nations, in so far as their conduct is a repetition of what has been, and, for the most part, human conduct is of this type, it can be predicted; but in so far as conduct in the future is new in human experience it cannot be foreseen by human agency. By what power the new in ideals and types of conduct appear is a matter of philosophical speculation. Men generally assume that they are themselves primary factors in the determination of their own moral development. This is the only healthy moral attitude for any individual to take towards himself. He may be lenient in his judgment of others and he may leave entirely to the Infinite Judge, the condemnation of others; but, if he is interested in others he must seek to stimulate in them the feeling of individual responsibility. This can be done best, generally, by holding them morally responsible for their conduct, and letting wrong doers know that we think it is within their own power to do better. Thus internal and external individual and social factors co-operate in moral reform. Summing up, then, there are people who assign to the devil the authorship of all moral evil; others somehow make God responsible for whatever happens; to the scientific materialist, evil may be merely a part of the constitution of the universe. What do any of these attitudes of mind contribute towards the betterment of the world, or to clear thinking on moral problems? Nothing. Let us, then, set them aside and turn to the time honored practice of holding sane men and social organizations responsible for their own conduct. There are two great sources of moral evil, i. e., selfishness and ignorance. We do not, as a rule, hold people responsible for the evil they create through ignorance; although, in legal practice, ignorance of the law is not a valid basis of defense, and,

218 IMPROVEMENT ERA

from a moral point of view, people may sometimes be censured for their ignorance. Both ignorance and selfishness have, doubtless, been prominent factors in bringing about this great European war. If those engaged in combat are the victims of a system, are not some individuals or groups of individuals responsible for the system? This responsibility may go back a generation to Bismark, Napoleon III, and others who pursued too intensely selfish ambitions, or the system may have grown out of unavoidable ignorance. In any case the civilized world is being given a severe lesson in the consequence of both selfishness and ignorance. The neutral nations should be able at once to profit immensely by this lesson. The nations at war must first recover their reason. In practically all wrong doing there is an offender and a victim. In the criminal court neither of these parties, or their representatives, are permitted to render judgment. Their interests are represented in the court by the attorney for the defense and the prosecuting attorney. Judgment is reserved for the judge and the jury who represent the impartial spectator. Bia^ at the beginning of the trial disqualifies either judge or juror. In this European crisis America is in the fortunate position of the imperial spectator. We are admonished by our government to be mentally neutral. This we should be until we are in possession of all the facts necessary to make a fair judgment. When that time comes we have the right and the duty to express our disapproval of unwarranted aggression or other wrong doing. If a nation is permitted to indulge in such aggression without suffering the disapproval of the civilized world, the world will have failed in its responsibility and opened wide the gates for further aggression. There is no wrong so great but that some moral benefit may follow, if men only make best use of their opportunities. This is such a case. The moral effects of the war will depend largely upon our feelings and judgments on all matters pertaining to it. On many questions it is too early to form a judgment. But may not civilized men with safety cultivate abhorrence of the theory that might makes right, and that guarantees of neutrality are to be respected only when they are not needed? The moral effect thus far in the minds of some persons, including one of our ex-presidents, seems to be the conviction that treaties of peace and arbitration are worthless and that our chief dependence must be upon the sword. On this point Prof. Giddings has written:

"Mutual aid is a more important factor in the struggle for existence than claw and fist; mutual aid is possible only among men that can trust one another, who tell the truth and keep their word, abiding by their covenants though they have sworn to their own hurt. If the civilized world

MORAL EFFECTS OF THE WAR 219

has degenerated to the plane of lawless bandits the mailed fist may be our only protection. I cannot believe that the moral attainments of thousands of years have thus been suddenly lost forever. The fact that this war is universally condemned by the civilized world, and that none of the nations engaged in combat are willing to be responsible for the outbreak, is a sure sign that the sense of right and a feeling for human welfare have made some progress in the last few centuries and that these considerations still command the respect of the nations."

Our hope lies in democracy as denned by one of our foremost thinkers; i. e., "the thinking and impulse-inhibiting habit developed in an entire people." In this country it is generally hoped that the conclusion of this war may see the end of the reign of kings in civilized countries, and in others as fast as the thinking and impulse-inhibiting habit can be formed. If the people immediately concerned can join us in this hope, doubtless it can be realized. This would mean great moral gains, including greater guarantees of world peace. We must continue to have faith in humanity and in the possibility of moral progress. A world federation of civilized nations and world peace after this war are no more unlikely than the success of an American Republic seemed to be at the time of the Revolutionary war; or a French Republic, during the progress of the French revolution. Energetic, courageous optimism is one of the chief factors in moral progress. Such optimism, if it can become general, may even turn this war into a means of moral progress. The war has already helped to clarify our sense of values; it has made of drunkards a sober nation; it has made of an industrial community a race of heroes. These are examples of what have been called heteronomy of ends in conduct; i. e., the accomplishment of a moral result quite apart from the end aimed at in the act. May not the values thus attained in war be saved for the ends of peace? May not peace bring the elimination of the chief causes of war, by the establishment of industrial democracies where before kings, aristocracies and militarism reigned supreme? "And one more thing must go," says Prof. Giddings. "The religion of barbarism must go. The world is weary of it. It has withstood the religion of peace on earth already too long. The trinity of king, cannon, and God, has outlived its usefulness. If civilization is indeed better than savagery, the God we worship must be a power other and worthier than a mere Head Devil of the Universe."