Some Problems of the War

Some Problems of the War BY DR. JOSEPH M. TANNER

That men should speculate about the outcome of the pres- ent war is the most natural thing in the world. Never did a war entail so much suffering on innocent people. Never were the dire consequences of a struggle of arms so universally felt as those which the world is now experiencing through the great Euro- pean war. When will it end? How will it end? Who will win? These are pertinent questions that people are asking themselves or asking one another. As the war stands, at present, no one can very easily figure out the advantages of one side over another. This is sometimes called the war of the trenches. If the armies must burrow one another out, the process will be very slow. Both sides have learned that an aggressive movement either way- means a ter- rible sacrifice of men, and when men are sacrificed to take one trench, a little way beyond it other trenches are found filled with men. No one knows just how many men who enter the defensive under such conditions are required to withstand aggressive at- tacks. Some say that one man in a trench is good for two out of it, others say for three. Certain it is that those on the de- fensive are capable of holding in check an army very much larger than its own. At present it does not seem possible for the Germans to make any further advancement toward Paris or to- ward Calais. They are practically blocked; and since they have begun to call out "Landsturm," it would seem that they are ap- proaching the end of their really effective supplies. True, Eng- land and Russia have greater sources from which to draw than Germany or Austria, but are these countries ready to sacrifice from two to three men for one? Can they afford to do it? The Allies can put more men on the defensive than the Germans, so that there is no means of calculating a success on the part of Germany, even if there were no advantage of being on the de- fensive. The question then resolves itself into this: Can Ger- many withstand the Allies? In the first place, Germany is fighting the Allies for the most part in their own countries, and while it is possible that the Allies may crowd Germany back within its own empire, the fiercest struggle would be yet to come. The Germans in Germany can put up a more effective -defense than they can in France or Russia. Take, for example, the western frontier of Germany. The whole country consists of rolling hills. It is covered by im-

354 IMPROVEMENT ERA niense forests which are penetrated and crossed by roads that the Germans have built, not only for securing timbers and for public convenience and railroads, but in them they have certain military purposes. Undoubtedly these roads are either mined or in a position to be mined immediately. Over them the armies of the Allies could not very' well go. They must make their •

way through the forests. A German soldier behind a tree, knowing all the ground minutely, should be good for three or four allied soldiers who have to make their way through the forests. Rushing the enemies' line under such circumstances is well nigh impossible. We may then say, in conclusion on the subject, that even should the Allies push the Germans back into their own country, their greatest problem is yet to be solved. On the east, the German line of defense is not so favor- able to the empire. In the first place, it is a long line. In the second place, the Germans have depended on the rivers and in ;

the third place, the Germans have not calculated on Russia in anything more than a near defensive war. Of course, Germany would go to the outskirts of Poland, on the east, if she could. To penetrate Russia is not, and never has been, the design of Ger- man tacticians. On the other hand, it may be assumed reason- ably that it will cost Russia two lives for every German soldier killed, in an effort of Russia to penetrate the heart of Germany. It must still further be remembered that Germany has a com- plete net work of so-called strategic railways on her eastern frontier, and that by means of these railways Germany can mass large armies in a marvelously short time. The strategy of German railroads makes one German soldier practically nearly the equal of two Russian soldiers. The numbers in the present struggle are too evenly divided to bring the end of the struggle within perceptible reach. If Russia could force the Germans back a hundred miles within East Prus- sia, the possibility of strangling the German empire for want of supplies would be within sight. As Germany stands today, with Belgium at her command, and in her possession, and all of East Prussia including a part of Russian Poland, she is in a position to support for a number of years her large population, even with her commerce in the world shut off. With the empire, it is no longer a question of commercial development ; it is merely a

process of existence. If Austria could be finally overthrown, and the Allies' armies permitted to enter Germany from the south- east, the problem would be much simpler. The easiest road to Berlin is probably by way of Cracow. As the matter stands to- day, Austria would be in the rear and the Carpathian mountains a splendid support to an Austrian army. If other nations are not drawn into the war, it looks as if the game must be a draw. While one party may feel exhausted