The Dependence of Morality upon Religion. III

THE DEPENDENCE Op MORALITY UPON RELIGION. BY CLAUDE T. BARNES. in. Having considered the deplorable result of the world's loss of even its fallible religions, and the auspicious moral tendency of a people whose belief in their religion is firmer than ever before, let us, now, come to the indeterminate, but real point of the dis- cussion — the psychological assumptions involved. That such ethical writers as Hyslop, Martineau, Mackenzie and Harris should consider their casuistry all-sufficient, is not surprising when we perceive that ethical philosophy is scientific and empirical, while religious ethics is spiritual and metaphysical. These casuists present many ingenious arguments in support of the theory that scientific ethics will maintain the world's moral equil- ibrium; hence it is best to meet them one at a time. James Martineau brought forward what Hyslop considers a complete refutation of the religious assumption; and it may be classified here as the childhood argument. Martineau said: "Childhood itself, small as are its concerns, is full of its moral enthusiasms and indignations, quick with its shame and compunction, bright with its self-approval; and, with all its heed- lessness, betrays every day the inner working and eager growth of conscience" — and he goes on to say that the little child knows nothing about religion; hence its morality is not caused by re- ligion. On its face, the syllogism is a clever and good answer; but

THE DEPENDENCE OF MORALITY UPON RELIGION. 599 probably it is a sophism, after all. We grant that the child knows nothing of religion, and that it has mcrality; but we do maintain that this morality is caused, after all, by religion. Its morality springs from the religion of its ancestors and is ingrained in its nature, even during development before it is born. This is a broad principle, necessitating some illustration and proof. On the basis of a normal type or standard, hereditary influ- ences appear in three classes: (1) those which tond to produce a degenerate individual ; (2) those which incline to produce a normal individual; and (3) those which bid fair to produce a person supe- rior to the ordinary standard. If, therefore, one of these vari- ations is manifest in one man, a second variation is bound to appear in another; so if we can prove that a certain family begets, as a rule, weak-minded children, it follows, of necessity, that some other family, as a rule, calls into being strong-minded children. Again, if one child may get a poor morality from its parents, some other child must get, from its parents, a good conception of mo- rality. Now, let us examine those anomalies which, from scientific demonstration, are shown to appear in some families, generation after generation. The first class above— indications of degener- ation—is termed stigmata hereditatis, and may be divided into psychic three groups: anatomic stigmata, physiologic stigmata, and stigmata. heads to In anatomic stigmata, one may find extremely large and likev\ise, in other families, be a characteristic of one family, the following: Facial asymmetry; Deformities of the palate, of the tongue and lips; Crookedness of the teeth; Peculiarities of the eye— flecks on the iris, strabismus, and chromatic asymmetry of the iris; dwarfishness, Misproportions of the body in general— hernias, breasts. giantism, and malformations of the physiologic stigmata, one may find blindness runnmg Under the following peculiarities run- through one family, and some of ning through others: functions-deaf-mutism, hyperes- Anomalies of the sensory

; 600 IMPROVEMENT ERA. thesia, neuralgia and concentric limitation, limitation of the visual field; — mutism and stuttering; Rarities of speech Peculiarities of the genito-urinary function— impotence. Abnormities of the instinct or appetite — voracity, dipsomania, and irresistible desire for drugs. — The third group psychic stigmata — has special application to the question at hand, for morality, in its last analysis, is a con- dition of the mind. The following are the different peculiarities of mind that may come to a child through heredity: Insanity; Idiocy; Imbecility; Pavor nocturnus; Precocity— one-sided talents, disequilibration; Feeble-mindedness Eccentricity; Moral delinquency; Sexual perversion. These facts are supported by Peterson and Haines, Blackmer, Crothers, Chapman and Manns — authorities on medico-legal juris- prudence. In their books they demonstrate by photographs that any one of the anomalies enumerated may come down through one family, generation after generation. Reverting then to Mr. Martineau's "irrefutable'' argument concerning the morality of the child, we easily confute it, "con- clusive" though Prof. Hyslop contends it to be, by affirming that not only the child's physical peculiarities, but the very instincts and motions of the brain have come from its parents and ances- tors; hence a child's morality is due to the religion of its ances- tors, even though the child itself knows not what the word "religion" means. Even though an Indian papoose be abducted and raised exclusively among white people, it will, as it grows, evince the characteristics of an Indian, running horses and whooping as often as he can. Conscience is but the mirror of one's religion; hence, when Mr. Martineau says that the child's conscience arises irrespective of religion, he indulges in a false reasoning, unlike the first only in words. Had the child, to which Mr. Martineau referred.

THE DEPENDENCE OF MORALITY UPON RELIGION. 601 been born from non- Christian parents in the heart of Africa, he would have found its conscience to be just as different as its en- vironment. It follows, then, that as moral delinquency can be transmitted by bad parents to their posterity, moral excellence can be bestowed by good parents to their children; hence, a child's morality ^*s determined by the goodness or badness, in fact, by the religion of its ancestors. More formidable even than Mr. Martineau's debatable point is Prof. Hyslop's reasoning.The latter lays great stress on the word "sanction," conceding that religion is a sanction of morality, but maintaining that it is not the only sanction. He uses the word "sanction" in the meaning of inducement or incentive, and insists that any one of the following considertions would produce morality, even though religion were non-existent: Utility, or happiness; Self-consistency; Value of the ideal; Social order; Public opinion; Law; Perfection. A little reflection on each of the above named motives for righteous living, discloses the potency of Prof. Hyslop's assump- tion, and even though it is mere a priori reasoning, it is supported, of course, by the self-sufficient system of nearly every ethical writer, A confutation of this comprehensive proposition involves, therefore, a negation of the moral sufficiency of every one of the sanctions Mr. Hyslop sets forth. Utility or happiness,— Utilitarianism as it was called by its originator, John Stuart Mill, is that ethical system which main- tains that the greatest happiness of the greatest number is an ad- equate standard for the production of morality. Oh happiness, our being's end and aim, For which we bear to live, or dare to die.— Pope. The insufficiency of Utilitarianism lies in its absolute ineffect- ualness as a preventive of those vices and wrongs inflicted se- cretly on the person. Utilitarians are liable to believe that a per-

602 IMPROVEMENT ERA. nicious effect of dishonesty upon the world's happiness comes only when it is arrant and open, and that undisclosed crimes are not going to affect anyone but the doer. Under this obviously in- competent and somewhat mischievous standard, in case a very poor employee steals from a wealthy corporation, he has not the slightest compunction of conscience, provided his act is cunningly free from the possibility of disclosure. Where, in Utilitarianism, is therean impediment to undiscoverable cheating and to suicide? where a dissuasion from concealed habits of drinking, masturbating and smoking? Undoubtedly these secret sins have little to do with the happiness of society in general; but with their commission there can be no complete morality; hence Utilitarianism is a manifestly imperfect substitute for religion. Less potent than the preceding suggestion of Mr. Hyslop is his assertion that self- consistency is a competent cause of mo- rality. The words are self-explanatory, and derive some origin, perhaps, from the expression of Cicero in his Paradoxes: No man who is wholly consistent within himself, and who reposes all his in- terest in himself alone, can be otherwise than completely happy. Now, one of the chief characteristics of a perfect ethical standard is its ubiquity; however secure the ambush, howe\er slight the mischief intended, there also must be the prohibitory warning. Unless the remonstrance appears in all cases, where it should, the source of the dissuasion must be defective to just that extent. Wherein lies the inconsistency of a drunkard's child being a drunkard, too? Its act certainly harmonizes with its hereditary propensities, and probably corresponds with the incompetency of its early instruction. What is there discordant in one being vain, unneighborly, inaffable, and acrimonious, if one's model is self? Such a fragile platform as self-consistency will not support one where self-love and self-comfort presses upon one's mind, demand- ing satisfaction, at any cost. He who, like Jekyll and Hyde, is good at one time and bad at another, is inconsistent and hypocrit- ical; but he who is bad all the time, and has no desire to reform, cannot be influenced in the slightest, by the shattered idol, self- consistency. To be consistent, is to be morally always the same; but as the life of a scoundrel may be just as uniform and consist-

THE DEPENDENCE OF MORALITY UPON RELIGION. 603 ent as the life of a worthy, self-consistency is, obviously, inad- equate as a moralizing power. That the value of an ideal is, also, a deficient inducement toward morality appears, by stronger reason, for it is an admitted fact, that usually only cultured and educated people ever think about ideals, while everyone thinks of religion. Besides, if a common man does ponder over an ideal, his conception is usually so peculiarly warped and shaped to fit his environment that it would be defective as a pure regenerating stimulus. Further, an ideal considered from a worldly standpoint, is visionary and unachievable; and from the very fact of its inaccessibility for mortals, conduces despondency and despair. It is meaningless without an inspiriting practic- ability; but if one, inadvertently, contends that the realization of the ideal need not occur in this life, then by adducing, as sup- port, the idea of a future existence, one grants the whole argu- ment of this article — that there can be no complete morality without a religion which includes a belief in life after death. Manifestly, therefore, a mere ideal, unassociated with the hope of attainment, is a weakly makeshift in the absence of that which includes all — religion. Much more unsubstantial than any of the foregoing assump- tions of Prof. Hyslop, is his theory as to the power of social or- der in substitution to religion. The refutation of the presumption concerning Utilitarianism includes an answer to the contention as to the moralizing sufficiency of social order, the latter being real- istic, while the former is both realistic and idealistic. What re- straint can be to a libertine to importune with the words, it "Cease your lechery; it is against the social order"? Like Mala- casta in Spenser's Faerie Queen, the voluptuary cares more for social welfare; and seldom does he repent un- libertinism than for less brought face to face with the awfulness of death. A drunk- may often commend sobriety; but he himself never will ard become a teetotaler from the mere consideration of the social epicure will not be indisposed to further good. Likewise, an hung himself when gluttony because someone tells him that Apicius the and that Greece and Rome he had spent his fortune on table, degenerated the moment they began to worship Manduce and Plu- selfish, such as an egoist or tus. Anyone who is inordinately

604 IMPROVEMENT ERA. nepotist, will never be influenced in the slightest by the common welfare; but, on the contrary, only that which pronounces upon his personal safety, and leads him to believe it may sometime have complete power over him, can be effective in its warnings. More- over, in ancient times, the Greeks undoubtedly murdered their cripples for the "social good," just as today Russians are slaugh- tering Jews for the sake of the social order. Who understands the social order more than W. E. Corey, who hss disgracefully left a faithful wife for an actress, Mabel Gillman? Does the social order prevent the illicit relations existing between Prince Joachim and Marie Sulzer, or between King Leopold and the notorious Cleo De Merode? No! temporal mores! What a sickly appeal does the social order have, even to those who should care for it most! So abhorrent are the multifarious examples under this head, that merely to recall them would be reducing the argu- , ment on the regenerating power of social order to an absurdity. A sophism even weaker than the preceding is the contention that public opinion is an adequate producer of morality. Public opinion will not prevent one secret crime, if its perpetrator thinks his tracks are absolutely covered; and further, every criminal has confidence in his ability to keep his deeds secure from public notice. That is the trouble; public opinion does not affect the evil doer until the act is already done. Did the strength of public opinion discourage, constrain, or remonstrate against the frauds of, a number of senators, and insurance presidents recently convicted, — all of them public swindlers? No! Public opinion did not affect them until the misdeeds were discovered, though, like Pandora's box, it then left them only hope. And even though public opinion has since flayed these culprits unmercifully, are there not just as many defaulters, just as many swindlers coming forth all the time? The argument fails: public opinion will not restrain anyone unless there is a possibility of a disclosure of his intended crime. Probably the most powerful, though certainly the least com- prehensive substitute for religion that Prof. Hyslop's list includes, is Law. Yes, it is authoritative and mighty; but, like the others, is inadequate still. A few years ago a smooth-tongued stranger came with a quack doctor, into a village, and during his brief stay there courted and married an unwise but good "Mormon"

. THE DEPENDENCE OF MORALITY UPON RELIGION. 605 girl; then heartlessly deserted her, when the doctor moved on. The act was cruel and heartrending, the young girl's life crushed; but the callous scamp went leisurely on his way, knowing the law to be powerless against him. Instances of the law's deficiency could be multiplied indefinitely, and it would be found that the sins which cut us most deeply, do not come at all under its incul- pation. Truly, therefore, to satisfy the law is not necessarily to be completely moral. Probably the most cogent of Prof. Hyslop's propositions, how- ever, is the one which maintains that Perfection is a sanction of morality, just as effectual as religion itself. To a Latter-day Saint the word perfection has a celestial significance, being associated with his idea of a hallowed state under the sole sovereignty of God; hence it is with no little diffidence that a refutation of the moral- izing sufficiency of Derfection is herein attempted. With a fervor in his heart and an inspiriting knowledge in his mind, the true Saint is daily striving, not by incense and libation, but by works, onward, upward, toward one goal— perfection; but that perfection he does not hope to attain to in this world nor in the world to come. The meaning of perfection will grow, and his pro- gress will go on eternally. Now, it is just here that Prof. Hyslop's assumption fails: it is admitted by all that perfection is unattainable in this life; but the moment one calls in, as Prof. Hyslop, to be consistent, must do, a future existence as the sphere of perfection's realization, one admits the necessity of that which explains man's relation to the infinite— religion. What futility, what impotence, character- izea standard which sees no hope of realization, no ultimate con- quering and joy! As applied to human beings, the word "perfec- tion" is meaningless without a belief in the hereafter. A follower of such a system must invariably become weary of endless strug- gles without attainment, and recklessly gives the latter part of his life over to the pleasures and relaxations of the flesh. To enforce all through a subjection of evil until the end, one must see hope life, and even expect to find it in the hand of the Grim Reaper at the door. Now, as perfection is incomuetent as a substitute for religion, law, and all by more reason, utility, social order, public opinion,

606 IMPRO VEMENT ERA. that Prof. Hyslop names, joined in one grand system, would still be inadequate; for all of them together go no higher than earthly perfection, which fails. Thus we see there is, really, qo incontrovertible ground for the thesis so confidently set forth by ethical writers. Never has there been devised yet a system or an inducement that can take the place of religion as the moralizing power of the world. Religion alone is omnipresent, or, as Mme. de Stael of France says: "The language of religion can alone suit every situation and every mode of feeling." In the first part of this article it was maintained that relig- ion signifies the relation which exists between man and the Infinite: and here we assert that morality is such conduct as harmonizes with that relation. This is the nucleus of the whole contention. Morality is inconceivable and purposeless without something to in- duce it, even to the very last breath of life. Religion alone ex- tends that far. Citizenship expresses the relation of an individual to a government, and obedience to the governmental laws is the resultant requirement of that relation; religion expresses the rela- tion between man and God, and morality is the resulting require- ment of that relation. To follow the analogy, morality cannot exist without religion, any more than obedience can exist without government. As Froude says in his biography of Carlyle 'The : ' secret of a man's nature lies in his religion, and what he really believes about this world and his own place in it." The longer we think of it, the more does religion become the antidote for our discontent, the monition against our evil inclinations, nourishment for our hunger for knowledge, and the sanctuary of our hope. Without it, we wander near a precipice, knowing no reason why we should not fall. It is the high reason of our existence, the final explanation of every worthy pursuit. It gives a heav- enly purport to love, and a rapturous assurance of its eternal continuation; while, without religion, the cruel separation of death leaves love an unending pain. We have seen how the world is adrift and alone, knowing not the true meaning of its existence; we have observed how this religious dilemma is causing goodness slowly to be sunken in the

— —; THE DEPENDENCE OF MORALITY UPON RELIGION. 607 quicksands of vice, and we have comprehended that religion is the only moral anchorage of life. If a Latter-day Saint, trust not him who has forsaken your ranks; raise your strong arm in defense of that truth you un- doubtedly have; and work for the blessing God is bound to bestow. Ann Arbor, TIniversity of Michigan.