Theology in Education, II

THEOLOGY IN EDUCATION. BY PROFESSOR WILLARD DONE, OF THE BRIGHAM YOUNG COLLEGE, LOGAN.

II.

PLACE OF THEOLOGY IN THE DOMAIN OF HUMAN LEARNING.

In the preceding paper, consideration was given to the definitions of knowledge, science, philosophy, and theology. From the statements there made, the following conclusions may be drawn and defended: 1. Knowledge is at first crude, unorganized, ununified; whether it is a knowledge of things or merely of phenomena, remains to be discussed. 2. When this knowledge is systematized and unified along^ various appropriate lines, it becomes science. 3. When all these sciences, in their most general laws and principles, are unified and organized to the limit of man's unaidedintellect, the result is philosophy.

4. This unified knowledge, the fruit of the intellectual powers,

and the knowledge gained through the exercise of faith, when combined under the influence of the Holy Ghost, constitute true theology. To the first of these propositions but little space will be given. Pyrrho and Timon, advocates of the skeptic school of philosophy, Kant, the great transcendentalist, and, in our own day, the agnostic school of philosophy, with Herbert Spencer as one of its chief representatives, have advanced the idea that all our knowledge is limited to phenomena, and that a knowledge of things in them-

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selves is impossible. It is impossible in this paper to go into metaphysical argument on the subject. It is sufficient to say that

men as noted as Mr. Spencer in the field of thought, affirm the opposite; and that common sense, the final arbiter of all disputed questions of speculation, loudly proclaims against such agnosticism. A few quotations may not be out of place: By the testimony, the words, and the works of other men, we know that human knowledge is always in like manner the knowledge of the subject knowing and the object known. I may say that the entire experience of mankind is the continuous revelation of these realities to the human consciousness, and that all human experience is conditioned

on their real existence. Man lives in their presence and in every act of intelligence sees their reality. If, therefore, the primordial postulate on which human knowledge rests is false, all human knowledge vanishes away.* Nor does it discredit the reality of knowledge that its evidence is not a demonstration. It is more than a demonstration; it is the very

essence of knowledge itself; it is the primitive datum which underlies every demonstration and makes it possible. Man lives in the light of the knowledge of himself and of the world, and all his experience is the continual illumination of these realities.f As the inner life has grown more complex in manifestation, and richer in content, the system of conceptions has progressed to correspond. It is by this contact with life and reality that thought grows, and not by — a barren logic chopping or verbal haggling about proof. * * * The law which the mind implicitly follows is this: Whatever our total nature calls for may be assumed as real in default of positive disproof.^ First, we must hold that the system of things is essentially a thought system. It is, however, not merely a thought, but a thought realized in act. As such it is real; and as such, it is transparent to thought. *

• • It may be unknown; it cannot be essentially unknowable.§

It can be shown that the theory of the relativity of knowl-

edge has arisen from barren speculation. Here the words of Goethe are applicable:

*Harris' "Philosophical Basis of Theism," p. 12. tibid, p. 13. JBowne's "Philosophy of Theism," p. 25. § Bowne's "Metaphysics," p. 487.

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a fellow who speculates is like a beast on a dry heathy I tell thee,

driven round and round by an evil spirit, while all about him lie the beautiful green meadows.*

From these and other similar considerations, we are led to think that it is best to take knowledge as it comes to us, real, knowable, filled with an essence which appeals to our consciousness, and satisfies the longing hunger of the intellect. The husks of ideality and phenomenalism are not soul-satisfying. The second proposition named above should not be difficult of explanation, and it needs no defense. All knowledge falls naturally into its appropriate class, and, unified and systematized, becomes science. Each of the sciences has its laws, according to which the knowledge included within the science is classified. Thus chemistry with its principles of atomic affinities; physics, with its laws of molecular motion; comparative anatomy, with its laws of proportion and interaction; astronomy, with its principles of stellar and planetary motion, become each a science, systematizing and classifying the facts which come into its circle of laws. The work of the chemist, the physicist, the anatomist, the astronomer, is to take these appropriate facts and unify them, each into his respective system of truth, and stamp them with the seal of science. Thus the individual sciences grow, and thus they will continue to develop, so long as there are men of learning and high aim, willing to devote life and energy to the work of broadening the field of human knowledge, and systematizing the fruits of special research. Nor should this labor be discredited. Much of the world's progress in intellectual culture, much of its advancement in material comforts, it owes to the labor of the patient, thorough scientist, proud of his work, and aware of its great possibilities. The third proposition introduces us to the work of the philosopher. It is his peculiar labor to take the work of the scientists, and bring the general laws they have discovered and formulated, into an ultimate union. If a general law runs throughout two or more of the special sciences, it may be formulated into a law of philosophy. This formulation is accomplished by developing knowledge to the highest possible degree of generality. This generality

• Mephistopheles, in "Faust."

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of the human intellect. is naturally limited by the limitations But when the process of unification and generalization has gone as far as man's unaided mind may carry it, the general laws thus resulting constitute philosophy. As Spencer says: And now how is philosophy constituted? It is constituted by carry-

ing a stage further the process [of generalization] indicated. So long as these truths are known only apart and regarded as independent, even the most general of them cannot without laxity of speech be called philosophical. But when, having been severally reduced to a simple mechanical axiom, a principle of molecular physics, and a law of social action, they are contemplated together as corollaries of some ultimate truth, then we rise to the kind of knowledge that constitutes philosophy proper.*

It is in the fourth proposition that the "parting of the ways" of the agnostic and the theist occurs. The former asserts that religion lies entirely outside the domain of human knowledge and deals alone with feeling — the indefinable longings of the soul. The latter claims that religion not only transcends the knowledge gained by human means, but includes this knowledge. It is not merely above human knowledge, but is large enough to embrace it. The arguments in support of this proposition, presented in the former paper, will not be repeated here. It may be safely left to the reader to establish in his own mind the proposition that faith will supply all deficiencies in the perfect unification of knowledge, bringing man, ultimately, to a complete understanding of the system of God, which includes the system of nature. This brings us to the consideration of the place and value of faith in the domain of human research. There are two methods of investigating the laws of nature, which may, for convenience, be called the doubt method and the faith method. The first starts out with the assumption that everything is false until its truth is

demonstrated; the second with the idea that everything which has strong probabilities in its favor may be given respectful consideration until it is disproved. The experience of men of intellect proves the superiority of the latter method. Not only is it of value in the domain of religious research — it is equally important in the

"First Principles," p. 135.

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realm of scientific thought. It has its counterpart in the dealings of man with man, where it is found to be much better to believe a man honest until he is proved a rogue, than to believe him a thief until he shows himself to be honest. One writer has truly-

said, with reference to these two systems:

It is a traditional superstition of intellect that nothing is to be

accepted which is not either self-evident or demonstrated. The corresponding conception of method is this: Let us first find some invincible fact or principle, something which cannot be doubted or denied without absurdity, and from this let us deduce by cogent logic whatever may be got out of it. When we reach the end of our logic let us stop. In other words, admit nothing that can be doubted. Make no assumptions, and take no step which is not compelled by rigorous logic. And, above all, let no feeling, or sentiment, or desire have any voice in determining belief. If we follow this rule we shall never be confounded, and knowledge will progress. Opposed to this conception of method is another, as follows: Instead of doubting everything that can be doubted, let us rather doubt nothing until we are compelled to doubt. Let us assume that everything is what it reports itself until some reasons for doubt appear. In society we get on better by assuming that men are truthful, and by doubting only for special reasons, than we should if we assumed that all men are liars, and believed them only when compelled. So in all investigation v/e make more progress if we assume the truthfulness of the universe and of our own nature than we should if we doubted both. Such are the two methods. The former assumes everything to be false until proved true; the latter assumes everything to be true until proved false. All fruitful work proceeds upon the latter method; most speculative criticism and closet-philosophy proceed upon the former. Hence their perennial barrenness. The first method seems the more rigorous, but it can be applied only to mathematics, which is purely a subjective science. When we come to deal with reality the method brings thought to a standstill,*

These words define quite clearly the position of the man who denies the existence of God and the efiicacy of faith, with reference to the work of man's intellect. His position is much more serious as regards his seeking after God, for no investigators who

*Bowne's "Philosophy of Theism," pp. 11, 12.

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have undertaken that research negatively, ever have found, or ever will find him. And their research in the realm of human knowledge will be just as barren of results. All this research presupposes faith in man's own powers, and in the reality of the principles of knowledge, or it is doomed at the outset to accomplish nothing. I

cannot do better here than quote the thoughtful words of Dr. Samuel Harris:

It is commonly said and widely accepted as unquestionable, that physical science, being founded on observation and induction, is certain knowledge; but that theological belief is only a faith which never becomes real knowledge. But physical science and religious knowledge are, as knowledge, the same in kind, differing only in their objects. The observation and experience on which physical science rests are self-evident, unproved, and unprovable knowledge. The principles on which all the inductions and deductions of physical science rest are self-evident, unproved, and unprovable knowledge. * * * ^.nd its verifications also are simply self-evident, unproved, and unprovable knowledge by cumulative observation and experience, by persistence in which, in the face of conscious fallibility and many mistakes, it attains what it rightly claims is real and indisputable knowledge. And this scientists call the scientific method; and because this knowledge has been attained in this method, they hold it for true in the face of unanswered objections and the utter inconceivableness of many of its conclusions; receiving it with all its inexplicable diflBculties, as a learned professor of natural science has said "without a wink."*

From the above we may rightly infer that the rejection of faith may ultimately lead to the rejection of the results, and the denial of the accuracy of man's reasoning powers. In fact, it appears that probably as many philosophers have rejected the latter as have disallowed the former. There is at least as strong a presumption in favor of the religious sense in man, as in the power

of independent thought. One is at first as prevalent as the other. Sometimes one is rejected, sometimes the other, sometimes both. In case faith is neglected, the atheist or the agnostic is produced; when intellect is dwarfed, the religious bigot too often results; when both are neglected, the result is nondescript, and incapable

"Philosophical Basis of Theism," p. 15.

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of accurate classification. In any of these cases, an anomaly is produced, denyinoj or discrediting one or more of his natural powers. And the unfortunate fact appears that this insufficiency of his knowledge is most keenly felt, when completeness of apprehension is most necessary, as in misfortune, sickness, and approaching death.

At such time, the more religious a man's philosophy has been, or the more philosophical his religion, the better is he prepared for the crisis that awaits him. That which to the atheist is a time of dread, or to the bigot a time of doubtful apprehension, becomes to the man of faith and intellect a step higher in misfortune or sickness, or, in death, a complete surmounting of life's difficulties, and a full realization of its desires. But this is really a digression from the subject in hand, though in one sense a corollary of the proposition that is being defended. The aim of these two papers has been to show that instead of being at enmity and deadly warfare with science, religion, in its truest sense, is the grand whole which embraces all scientific knowledge. Surely it is an anomaly if the part is in opposition to the whole, or vice versa. In conclusion, it may be stated that there is a special system of theology, dealing with the specific laws which govern But this is only a part of the perfect sysman's religious duties." tem of thought and feeling which is all-embracing in its extent. It is so to speak, the ethical element, governing the practice of divine law;whereasthe complete system embraces philosophy, theory, and the higher reaches of thought, which can no more be measured by man's puny actions, than the vast reaches of infinite space can be comprehended by his unaided vision. It is this illimitable system of thought and faith— this infinity of knowledge, "The deep — where all our thoughts are drowned," which may be justly said to include all knowledge that is worth the knowing, all desire that is worth the feeling, all pov/er that is worth the swaying. In this sense the term is used; and from this standpoint the crowning proposition is defended, that he who would comprehend human knowledge in its entirety, must reach a comprehension, at least in part, of the divine, which stands to the purely human, in the relationship of whole to part. The next paper will be devoted to a consideration of theology as a branch of study.