Theology in Education

IMPROVEMENT ERA.

Vol. III. MARCH, 1900. No. 5.

THEOLOGY IN EDUCATION. BY PROFESSOR WILLARD DONE, OF THE BRIGHAM YOUNG COLLEGE, LOGAN.

I.

PLACE OF THEOLOGY IN THE DOMAIN OF HUMAN LEARNING.

The writer confesses a considerable degree of diffidence in approaching a subject upon which there has been so much controversy. But the explanation that this treatment of the subject is to be considered merely as the presentation of a few phases of it

from the writer's personal point of view, will rob the critic of one weapon of attack, however he may use the weapons which still remain in his hands. For on this subject there has been and still is a great deal of controversy, ranging from friendly discussion to quarrels filled with the venom of personal malice, and stained with the blood of combatants. On the broad subject of the relation-

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ship between religion and science, many volumes have been written, heavy in more ways than one. A large percentage of these books have been devoted to a consideration of the antago- nism which men have made to exist between the two lines of human thought and endeavor, while some have attempted, by means of compromises, to establish a unity between them. So far as this aim will be to series of papers touches this important theme, the show a relationship, neither of antagonism nor of compromise, but rather of part to whole. After that, the endeavor will be to — — show the importance indeed the indispensableness of both ele- ments in our educational theory and practice. In the attempts which have been made by philosophers and historians to fix the relationship between theology and other subjects of study and investigation, an antagonism between theology and science has been frequently asserted. Men of science have claimed that theologians are entrenching on their domains, and usurping some of their prerogatives, while counter-charges to the same effect have been hurled back at the scientists. It appears, however, that theologians have acted largely on the defensive, protecting what they conceived to be religious essentials against the encroachments of scientific fact and theory; while the position of the scientists has been generally more aggressive. On this account, as well as for other reasons, most of the existing emanated from the literature on this subject of controversy has scientists. The general impression created therein is that the theologians have not only been in the wrong, in the matter of argument, but that, still worse, they have attempted to eke out insuflacient arguments with violence and persecution. In support of the assertion that this idea prevails, passages, almost at random, may be quoted from the works of such men as Draper, White, Spencer, and others. Here are a few: "The true position of the earth in the universe was established only after a long and severe conflict. The church used whatever power she had, even to the infliction of death, for sustaining her ideas. But it was in vain. The evidence in behalf of the Copernican theory became irresistable."*

• Draper's "History of the Conflict between Religion and Science," 182.

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"In whatever direction thoughtful men looked, the air was full of fearful shadows. No one could indulge in freedom of thought without expecting punishment. So dreadful were the proceedings of the Inquisition, that the exclamation of Pagliarici was the exclamation of thousands: 'It is hardly possible for a man to be a Christian, and die in his bed!'"*

" As long as he (Buff on) gave pleasing descriptions of animals the church petted him, but when he began to deduce truths of philosophical import, the batteries of the Sorbonne were opened upon him. * * *

For his simple statement of truths in natural science which are today truisms, he was dragged forth by the theological faculty, forced to recant publicly, and to print his recantation."t " Eminent dignitaries of the church attacked him (Lyell) without mercy, and for a time he was under social ostracism."^ " This kind of protest of necessity accompanies every change from

a lower creed to a higher. The belief in a community of nature between himself and the object of his worship, has always been to man a satisfactory one; and he has always accepted with reluctance those successively less concrete conceptions which have been forced upon him."§

Such is the trend of thought throughout not only the works above cited, but throughout practically all the volumes written

from the same standpoint. Is there a foundation for this charge, so generally made, that religion has been an unfair opponent of science, or is there a mistake in the point of view of the writers referred to, and others of their kind? It must be admitted that the historical statements they make are in the main correct. That Galileo, Bruno, Copernicus, Lyell, Winchell, and others from the middle ages to our own time, have been treated with unfair harshness for their scientific researches and utterances, is beyond question. But in this unseemly and often bloody controversy, has religion been opposed to science? Have not the historians of this conflict made a mistake in their

• "History of the Conflict between Religion and Science," p. 207.

t White's "A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology,' Vol. I., p. 61.

$ Ibid, p. 233. § Spencer's "First Principles," p. 116.

324 IMPROVEMENT ERA.

use of terms? Has it not rather been a conflict between bigotry the narrow dogmatism of men —and the promoters of scientific

investigation? In a word, is it not a conflict of men, and men's opinions, rather than a conflict of principles? To the question, "Has there been any conflict between religion and science?" a strong negative answer, it appears, may be given. There is a conviction in the mind of the writer, that the mistake of supposing a conflict to have been waged between religion and science, is due in part to a misapprehension of the relationship between theology and other branches of learning. Writers on both sides of the controversy have had no very clear conception of the nature of theology, in its relationship to other lines of thought. To prove this assertion, citation will be made of Spencer's of knowledge, science, philosophy, and theology. definitions After a long and elaborate argument on ultimate scientific and religious ideas, he thus sums up his findings:

" He (the philosopher) realizes with a special vividness the utter incoraprehensibleness of the simplest fact, considered in itself. He, more than any other, truly knows that in its ultimate essence nothing can be known."*

"Knowledge of the lowest kind is un-unified knowledge; Science is

partially-unified knowledge; Philosophy is completely-unified knowledge."t

" If knowledge cannot monopolize consciousness — if it must always

continue possible for the mind to upon that which transcends dwell knowledge; then there can never cease to be a place for something of the nature of Religion, since Religion under all its forms is distinguished from everything else in this, that its subject matter is that which passes the sphere of experience."!

A summary of these definitions may be thus expressed: All knowledge is relative; we may never know things themselves, but only their relationships. This relative knowledge is first detached, un-unified; then partially unified (science), then completely unified (philosophy). When we have come to the end of experience, and have acquired all this relative knowledge possible, religion (or

• "First Principles," p. 69. t Ibid, p. 136. tlbid,p. 17.

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theology) commences. It deals only with that which is beyond the reach of human knowledge and experience. With such ideas of the relationship between science and religion, it is no wonder that scientists and philosophers have accused theologians of entrenching on their (the scientists') domain. How could they affirm anything, except possibly the one, simple fact, "God lives," without entrenching on this domain? And, strange to say, as soon as this one, simple, restricted statement is made, and the theologian endeavors to comfort himself with the "one ewe lamb" left to him, the scientist exclaims, "Prove it, scientifically!" And thus the theologian is drawn again into his ofl[ense of trespassing on the prohibited demesne. Does this statement of the case seem absurd? It would appear that a fair statement of this anomalous condition can scarcely be otherwise than absurd. Yet just such difficulties will be continually encountered, so long as the definitions cited above are allowed to pass unchallenged. Just so long, too, will it be impossible for a definite, positive statement of a religious character to be made. For what man can speak positively of that which has not entered, in some form, into his own experience? And is it not clear that in order to be of any value at all, religion must be positive? It is no wonder, then, that since the tendency has been to relegate theology to the domain of the incomprehensible, any effort on the part of theologians, as such, to enter into the great questions of science and philosophy has been resisted and denounced. If this is the logical result of the definitions cited above, it remains to be considered whether those definitions are correct or not. Does theology belong merely to the realm of the incomprehensible? Must theologians surrender all of that realm that is conquered by advancing science and philosophy? If so,

theology will have but an imaginary existence, dealing only with vagaries, beyond the reach of thought and understanding. Passing by Spencer's definition of knowledge, which is, to say the least, incomplete, and of philosophy, which, if not impossible, is at least unsatisfactory, (for when may completely unified knowledge be reached?) consideration will be given to his definition of religion. In answer to his statement this proposition will

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be laid down and defended: Religion, and its corollary, theology, has to do not only with the incomprehensible (as Spencer would characterize God and his existence) but with the works of God, the relationship of man to God, and of man to man. A definition of theology narrower and less comprehensive than this, would be unsatisfactory to Latter-day Saints who have come to regard their religion and its principles and duties, as all in all. One way to determine the meaning of a word, is to consider its derivation. Following this rule in the present case, theology is found to be derived from two Greek words, meaning, broadly, "the science of God." The definition of the word based entirely on its

derivation, would seem sufficient so far as breadth is concerned,

but not in reference to detail. That is, while it may be made to include all that may be desired, it does not express enough. Filling in the details which are logically included in the broad definition given above, it will be seen that if theology is the science of God, it must also be or include, the science of his works. Is the Maker less than his creation ? Since there is a God, he is the Creator and Ruler of all things visible and tangible. Therein consists a great degree of his Godhead. (Not *all of it, for things invisible also aremade and ruled by him). Is a creator, either human or divine, known in any other way than through his word and works and influence? In studying the life and character of a man, account must always be taken of his works. Even though little be known of him directly, he is revealed and may be studied to a great degree, through his works. We approach Fulton through the steamboat, Stephenson through the locomotive, Watt through the steam-engine, Edison through the electric light, Morse through the telegraph, and every great author through the books he has written. For a very obvious reason, it is impossible for us fully to understand these men through their work, for they have put there the best that is in them, and only they who have associated closely with the men, and also studied their works, have really known them. We may read the works of Dr. Samuel Johnson, but only a Boswell knew him as he was. So Xenophon was the interpreter of Socrates; Mark, of Peter; Luke, of Paul; and John the Apostle, of Christ. Is there not an analogy here? God has not put all of

• THEOLOGY IN EDUCATION. 327

himself into the works which come within man's comprehension. On account of their necessary imperfection, he has not even put the best of himself into them. But while a personal association is necessary to a full and perfect understanding of him and his

attributes, we, in our temporary absence, cannot know him unless we have some comprehension of his works. Hence it follows that a thorough study of God includes a study of his works. It

is, however, farthest from the writer's thought to infer that the study of God's works is of greater importance than the study of his word. Going as far as man may, into the study of the creations of God, in the absence of his word we may approach little or no nearer to an understanding of him. All that is desired to be conveyed here, is that his nature, and even his word, is made clearer to us through his works than would otherwise be possible. The analogy above referred to, may be carried farther. If it is impossible to understand God without some comprehension of his works, so it is impossible to understand his works in their entirety, without some comprehension of the design of their Creator. An analogy of the same kind may be found in the simplest works of art and manufacture. One might study a watch, in every detail of its construction, and yet remain ignorant as to its true nature, until the intent of its manufacturer is either discovered o^* revealed. The watch and its true significance would be made known to him through its purpose, the measurement of time. So the dynamo through its purpose, the generation of electrical energy; the camera through its purpose, photographing; the telegraph through its purpose, the transmission of messages; and so on, ad infinitum. A clear and perfect comprehension of these would be impossible without a knowledge of their purpose, the reason for their being in existence. But these simple appliances reveal their ultimate purpose to the careful observer, much more readily and clearly than do the " infinitely greater and more comprehensive works of God. While the chemist may see the immediate results of the union of chemical elements, and judge in part the purpose of this union, it is clearly seen that he cannot understand the final purpose of such unions, even the simplest of them, without a knowledge of the design of him who instituted the principles of chemistry, from