The South African War

SOUTH AFRICAN WAR. BY DR. J. M. TANNER, PRESIDENT OF THE STATE AGRICULTURAL COL-

LEGE, LOGAN, UTAH.

II.

there has been a gen- Since the war broke out in South Africa people of England to support the eral disposition on the part of the question of partisan politics, but party in power. It is no longer a which the success of the Enga question of patriotism, a war in every Englishman. On the other lish arms is dear to the heart of war a popular one. Many hand, it must not be supposed that the is

opposed to it; they thought that of the Liberals are very strongly unhappy consequences might be the war with all its harsh and patience and diplomacy. avoided by the exercise of some The Uitlanders in South Africa saw in this division the prob- abilities of a longer delay in the adjustment of their difficulties in case the Liberals came into than they wished for, especially very questions that power The Liberals are Home Rulers. The elections of England are questions bear them up in the popular their rights of the Boers in the rule of that go to the fundamental as the wheel of political own country. The Uitlanders saw that round, sooner or later the Liberals would again be success turned to hope for from them than from on top and they had much less therefore, of the Uitlanders waste the Conservatives. The policy, and force it as soon as possible force the questions to an issue, Chamberlain, they had a warm friend In the Foreign Minister, Mr. the opportunity of forcing the and sympathizer, and if they missed

210 IMPROVEMENT ERA issue during his administration, they might have to postpone the fulfillment of the hopes which they were building up, for an indefinite period of time. It became, therefore, an easy matter to increase the agitation in South Africa, to multiply difficulties, and to make an intervention on the part of another country almost an absolute necessity. But England had other reasons for preferring the war now. It will be remembered that in 1896, the Jameson raid revealed the fact that Rhodes and others were laying a scheme for an up- rising in which the Uitlanders would take the initiative and Eng- land be compelled to follow. The Jameson raid was a conspicuous failure. It was so bold and untimely as to create the most intense feeling of hatred on the part of the Boers for the English. Jame- son had not acted wisely, and about the only explanation that Mr. Rhodes could offer was that Jameson had upset his apple cart, and Rhodes' calculations were therefore all scattered, and it must necessarily take a long time before they could be gathered up and concentrated as Rhodes thought he had them concentrated at the time of the Jameson raid. This led to the unification of the Dutch throughout ^ all South Africa, so that those who lived in Cape Colony under English Dominion made their sympathy for their brethren in the Transvaal a and conceived the idea that the Dutch through all political issue,

South Africa should be united in a common cause, with common interests—without undertaking to throw off English rule— in certain national aims. This was called the "Africander Bund," and leading Englishmen saw that as this Bund become more powerful it might very easily lead to an alliance of all the Dutch in South Africa— an alliance that, in case of war, would group all the Dutch together in arms against the English. And again, it might be the initiative leading to a South African revolution. If the Dutch of Cape Colony, an English province, should rise in arms, the rebellion would be more formidable, because all the Dutch practically could enter the field, while of the Englishof Cape Colony there would be only comparatively few in numbers who would be prepared to take up arms. Soldiers would have to be provided from elsewhere. In Cape Colony there are two hundred and sixty-five thousand Dutch and one hundred and ninety-four thousand English. The

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preponderance, therefore, of the Dutch over the English in this colony, and the disposition on the part of the former to take up arms being more general than it would be among the English, might increase the difficulties which England would have to encounter in case of a general uprising. It may thus be seen that those who most favored the aggres-

sive policy of Mr. Chamberlain, and especially the Uitlanders, have been governed largely by the idea that it would be dangerous to postpone the war, and that the difficulties might by postponement be protracted for an indefinite length of time. The causus belli, however, of the war is to be found largely in the commercial difficulties which the Uitlanders have to encounter. They jare dependent for their existence upon the outside world. Their breadstuffs, their clothing, all implements, and most all of the necessaries of life come from abroad, and these are taxed as they pass through the different colonies on the road to the great city of Johannesburg. Long lists of grievances of a commercial character oppreshave been set forth by the Uitlanders as evidence of the sion they were under. Examples of this may be found in the tax on dynamite used for mining purposes. It costs there seventeen dol-

lars per case, when it could be bought out of the state for less

than ten dollars. And a concession on dynamite has been granted of dollars a year out of it. to a company which makes millions paid for Enormous prices by reason of similar concessions are The railroads discriminate and charge as much for haul- candles. forty-seven miles from the border of the ing freight a distance of costs to haul the same freight a Transvaal to Johannesburg as it thousand miles from the seaport. in this war claim Those who undertake to justify England humanitarian; that the treking of that one of her purposes is also purpose of migrating to a land the Boers was not simply for the political privileges, but for the wherein they could enjoy greater slavery,and that symptoms purpose of maintaining the institution of This, of course, is denied by of slavery still exist in that country. the native service is simply the Boers who undertake to show that it will hardly do to ascribe the a condition of employment. But question. There are English position in this war to the slavery those, no doubt, to whom this excuse appeals very strongly.

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Connected with the charge of slavery is also the charge that English missionaries have been treated very harshly by the Boers. Whatever that treatment may have been, it is certain that the missionaries manifest a strong dislike of a people into whose relig- ion they have been unable thus far to make any inroad. The Boers maintain strongly their faith, and it has been one of the leading causes of their union, and, no doubt, one of the leading causes of the great treks which they have in the past undertaken. Before and at the opening of the war, the ministers certainly did all they could to create popular prejudices throughout England and America by writing in denunciation of the Boers, and wherever a missionary discussed the question, people generally expected to find him against the Boers and in favor of this war. But while the missionary sympathizers may justify the war in part on the grounds of the grievances set up by the missionaries, it is certain that the treatment of missionaries by the Boers has played really no part whatever in this matter. Besides, the grievance is old, for in recent years there has been but little conflict between the Boers

and the missionaries. It is evident that even now, in the midst of war, the leaders among the Liberal party have not withdrawn entirely the strong opposition which they felt at its commencement. Bryce, the author of the "American Commonwealth," a prominent Liberal, has written a work upon "Impressions of South Africa." Bryce is very popular and considered a very impartial author. His book was published in 1898. Now that the war has broken out a revised edition is to be issued, and in it he says, speaking of the causes that led to this war: "The Boers made concessions, but the English held these concessions insufficient. In the course of this dicsussion the British ministry used language which led the Transvaal people to believe that they were determined to force the Boer government to comply with their demands; and they followed up their dispatches by sending troops from England to Africa. They justified this action by pointing out (and the event has shown this to be the fact) that the British garrison in South Africa was insufficient to defend the colonies. But the Boers naturally felt that if they remained quiet till the British forces had been raised to a strength which they could not hope to resist, they would lose the only military advantage which they possessed. Accordingly, when they knew

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out in England, and that an army that the reserves were being called they declared war, having been corps was to be sent to South Africa, rightly or wrongly, that the British for some time previously convinced, to coerce them. They were in sore straight, aovernment had resolved been expected from them, Indthey took the course which must have which brave^men who are not going to and, indeed, the only course make further concessions could have taken." regarding the present situa- Continuing further, Mr Bryce says tion: for England also since it is "To some of us it appears a calamity generations to come, the bulk of the white likely to alienate, perhaps for self-governing colonies; it may, population in one of our most important for her the ultimate loss of South Africa. indeed, possibly mean Chamberlain had but little to At the outbreak of the war, Mr. his reticence in some comment over say, and the press indulged he could restrain himself and wondered how it was possible that frequently indulges and m which from speech-making in which he extreme cnaracter Recent^, hisrepresentations are of the most to arrange for a speech at Leices however, he found it convenient certain portions of the tar He had been extremely goaded by papers was attitude of some French ontinental press, and the m ost exasperating to him. extreme criticism and were «^J Indeed, the papers hat attacking the person of the Queen, notice had was that, although not worthy of de cendedto a vileness Sis to the attack extremely aggravating. upon the Queen arose from The ^^J*\£ the ann(^c«ment.thatt ^part of fte she would spend the coming winter in the Itahan delightful country for those who delight in the Riviera, a warm and Europe. wintry months of northern fun shine during the cold shore of the Genoa along the The Riviera extends from winter season, Nice, and, during the Mediterranean as far west as of he be found in any part Perhaps as nearly Paradise as can to make h conditions led the Queen Trd I suppose political

Inge French and go to Italy instead of to were very critical toward the France, <^%£* English at the outbreak ot

the war Some "of the most disreputable, as «--££ of the Queen, attack upon the person French journals, began an their character. andmade references quite vulgar in

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Mr. Chamberlain seems to have lost his temper, and he undertook in his speech to lecture the French, and, in his reference to France, made statements that were threatening in their character. He warned the French that such attacks "may have serious consequencesif our neighbors do not mend their ways." He also spoke of the very friendly interest existing between England* Germany and the United States. He made reference to an AngloSaxon, or Tuetonic alliance. In the use of the word "alliance," he had accentuated perhaps too strongly the friendly interest between Germany and England, as a number of the German newspapers at once repudiated the idea that there was an alliance between England and Germany. However, he did represent that these three countries were practically in accord with reference to their foreign policy. Whether that accord of foreign policy will lead to an alliance, is yet to be seen. England had recently been treating Germany to high consideration. She has practically withdrawn her interest in the Samoan Islands on terms most favorable to Germany, and according to Germany's own wishes. The adjustment of the Samoan question between England and Germany, was evidently a stroke of high diplomacy on the part of England in her play for the friendly interest of Germany. That the Liberals will take every advantage of what they consider the mistakes of the Conservatives in this war, to strengthen their position, may be seen again from the remarks of Lord Rosebery at Edinburgh, wherein he makes reply to Mr. Chamberlain. Lord Rosebery says:

"We have no right to go into the gutters (speaking of the French) to fish up the derelict press of any country and to hold it up to scorn, as a motive of our policy. It is impossible that the Queen could be besmirched by such attacks, which only recoil on the attackers; but, whatever the degraded outburst may mean, it does not represent the best or highest opinion of France. We have been over-ready to flout other nations, and it is no wonder that Great Britain is unpopular abroad. I do trust that this undiplomatic frankness will cease, for these stinging words rankle long afterwards, and it is not for statesmen to speak under the passing irritation of the moment."

The events of the war clearly demonstrate that England has again been guilty of the sin which has characterized her move-

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ments in almost every war of the last half of this century, namely, an underestimation of the strength of her enemies. At this time, it is not possible to give any very correct idea of what has actually

taken place in the movements and contests on the battlefield. The Boers have moved their forces south into Natal, a British province, where most of the fighting, up to the present time, has taken place. There have been battles at Glencoe, Colenso and Estcourt. Seventeen thousand British are now shut up in Ladysmith, Kimberly and Mafeking. The battle of Modder River is perhaps the

most sanguinary struggle that has yet taken place, but the paucity of news from the seat of war is such that it is very difficult at this

writing to give the results of the struggle. The British own the cable lines from South Africa, and the coloring. news that reaches us has, of course, a strong British wide discrepancy in Recent statements from the other side, show a but in the size of the the estimates, not only of the men lost, from four forces. Here is an example. The English say that Talena Hill October 20th, thousand to nine thousand Boers occupied Boers gives the number under Lucas Meyer. The account of the thousand. In the attack made by General Symons asabout one that from six hundred to upon the Boers, the English report says The Boer report says twenty- nine hundred Boers were wounded. permits so little seven The fact that the war office in England front to be made known, indicates at of the news coming from the meeting with that success which any rate that the English are not for. the friends of England are looking Boers had deteriorated m the _

been supposed It has that the the excellent riflemen that they use of their arms, and were not battle of Majuba Hill was fought were some years ago. When the victorious in a conflict against six hundred in 1880 the Boers were own soldiers numbered only one hun- English soldiers, when their however, fewer than thirty dred and fifty. In the Jameson raid, number is said to have been the men were killed, and this small on the part of the Boers in the result of a general deterioration supposed, therefore, that the Boers use of the rifle. Many have and, therefore, at a disad- would be outmatched in markmanship, English soldier on the field. vantage when they came to meet the in the standard of mark- falling off All this speculation about the

216 IMPROVEMENT ERA. manship of the people of the Transvaal seems to have been entirely misleading; and now the English are reminded that within the last year or two the Boers have been in constant practice, that they have been under the training of French artillerymen and German officers, and are constantly trained to a higher standard of mark- manship than was supposed to exist among them. It is hardly likely that the Boers will undertake the storming of the cities in which the British are shut up. That would entail a loss of men which they cannot afford, and it is said that even should they intend to storm Ladysmith, they have no bayonets with which to make a charge. There has been some thought that the natives would join the British in the present war. Certainly the British would offer no aid to such a policy as this,and have already probably informed the natives that in the absence of an attempt on the part of the Boers to invade their lands, they are to remain neutral. News, however, reaches us of an uprising among the natives, and an effort on their part to take sides with England. This would be somewhat of a seriousmovement to the Boers. The natives in recent years have been to some extent armed, and if they should attack the Boers on the rear the latter would be obliged in defense of their homes and families to withdraw a considerable portion of their army to defend the frontier against the negroes. On the other side, it is not unlikely that an effort to secure the assistance of the natives would result in disaffection among the Boers of Cape Colony, who might easily be induced to leave this British possession to join their brethren in the Transvaal. Indeed, it is already said that numbers of farmers from the northern part of Cape Colony have already cast their lot on the side of the Boers in the present war. At this time it is not possible to determine just how many soldiers the Boers have in the field. Only the "first-call" men, about twenty-five thousand were summoned. The "first-call" men include those between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. It is said, however, that five thousand of the second-called men have joined the army of the Boers without a summons, and that about ten thousand from Natal and other provinces have enlisted, so that the entire army must now aggregate somewhere in the neighborhood of forty thousand men. Eng-