--- title: Improvement Era description: Monthly periodical of the Mormon church, 1897 onward. This library holds the issues of November 1897 to December 1930. authors: - Bennion, Milton collections: - periodicals tags: - magazine - improvement-era periodical: Improvement Era volume: 33 number: 1 published: 1929-11 publisher: Young Men’s Mutual Improvement Associations publisher_place: Salt Lake City language: en type: magazine reference: "Milton Bennion, “A Spiritual Philosophy of Life,” *Improvement Era* 33, no. 1 (November 1929): 47–49." source: url: https://archive.org/details/improvementera3301unse transcription: Transcribed from the Internet Archive scan of each issue (the item for each issue is named in the issue's own source); unnumbered advertising leaves are omitted, printed page numbers are kept as page markers. identifier: improvementera3301unse start_page: 47 end_page: 49 rights: status: public-domain basis: US publication 1930 or earlier (published 1929-11) source: https://archive.org/details/improvementera3301unse publication_year: 1929 note: The Internet Archive item metadata carries a blanket "© Copyright by Intellectual Reserve, Inc." notice. The library owner judged it inapplicable because this issue was published in 1929, before 1931; a scan-level notice does not restore copyright. --- # A Spiritual Philosophy of Life A Spiritual Philosophy of Life The first of a series of twelve articles By MILTON BENNION Dean of the School of Education, University of Utah THE term philosophy is de- rived from Greek words meaning "love of wisdom." The title philosopher was applied to leaders of thought among the Greeks as early as 600 B. C. One of the outstanding char- acteristics of the early Greek philosophers was that they sought to replace the myth- ological explanations of the nature and the origin of the world with explanations based upon observation and reason. This point of view and method has ever since characterized philosophy. Although philosophers may indulge freely in specula- tions, their speculations rep- resent the outcome of reason applied to the facts of ex- perience. Philosophy may be de- fined as an effort, based upon the sum total of hu- man experience, to under- stand the nature and mean- ing of the world. It is an effort "to see life steadily and to see it whole," a phrase that comes to us from the ancient Greeks and is often quoted by contempo- rary writers in both phil- osophy and education. Metaphysics, the heart of philosophy, is said by Wil- liam James, in his character- istic fashion, to mean, "only an unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly and consist- ently."1 That all intelligent, serious-minded men and women are in some degree metaphysicians is evident. In regard to the char- acteristics of intelligence the dis- tinguished French philosopher, Henri Bergson, says: "Intellect, alone, indeed, troubles itself about theory; and its theory would fain embrace everything — not only inanimate matter, over which it has a natural hold, but even life and thought."2 One who thus constructs theory is, to that extent, a philosopher. This is not to say that the same person may not also be very prac- tical. Bergson also says, "We re- gard the human intellect * * * as relative to the needs of action."3 The Author Psychology, Briefer Course, p. 461. Henry Holt 8 Co., New York. 2Creative Evolution, p. 160. Henry Holt 8 Co., New York. 'THE term spiritual in philosophy *- is used in contrast with the merely material and mechanical. Our civilization, for instance, has accumulated certain material values; such as railroads and other means of communication, factories, and buildings, public and private. The spiritual values of civilization are, however, to be found in its great bodies of scientific and social knowledge, world literature, mu- sical compositions, philosophy, and religion, that have been developed by the labors of many and trans- mitted as a contribution to the life of succeeding generations. A spirit- ?Ibid. p. 152. ual philosophy is one that gives recognition to the preeminence of these phases of civilization and, in this connection, recognizes as the most real and enduring aspect of the world, of which we are a part, life itself with all that this implies in its higher ranges — ideals, conscious purposes, choice of- ends, sympathetic understanding of the social order and its strivings to- ward higher goals. The materialtistic - me- chanistic view on the other hand starts with basic con- ceptions of physical science as generally promulgated by Sir Isaac Newton, his scien- tific associates, and their successors. This mechanical, rigid, deterministic concep- tion of nature is now extend- ed in materialistic philos- ophy to include the whole universe, even all that has here been designated as spiritual. Thus everything that is, is reduced to an aggregate of atoms or neu- rons in motion in exact agreement with the same mechanical laws with which the physical sciences deal. The feeling of creative power, choice of ends, and responsibility are thus re- duced to mere illusions to be dissipated in the light of science. This type of science holds that the world of our experience began with nothing but matter in motion, some of which somehow fell into very com- plex and intricate aggregations called living creatures, but still nothing more than mechanisms to be fully explained by the laws of physical science. The practical im- plication of adoption of such a world view with its corresponding judgments of human nature and destiny is clearly manifest; our first concern, however, is not with its consequences but with its truth or falsity. The basic question for philosophy is: 48 The Improvement Era For November, 1929 What is the Ultimate Nature of the World? TS it a rigid, mechanistic, material- istic system, or is it fundamen- tally a living, self-active, creating energy or system or aggregate of such energies? What, then, does rational con- sideration of all the facts of expe- rience yield in constructing a theory of the nature of reality? It seems evident to the writer that such consideration leads to rejection of mechanistic materialism; first, be- cause any attempt to think to its logical conclusions this conception of the nature of reality proves it to be inconceivable and, therefore, even prior to experience, impossible as theory; and second, because in experience this theory is wholly in- adequate to explain the facts. This is not to deny the existence of mechanical forces in nature, to minimize their importance, or to discredit the physical sciences. It does mean to deny that the me- chanistic conception of nature is adequate to explain the whole of reality. Because physical energy was essential to the production of the philosophy of Kant is no rea- son for assuming that this phil- osophy is thus wholly accounted for, however far back through an- cestry this mode of explanation is carried. The fact that something is essential to the production of an activity is no proof that the one is sole cause of the other, or even that it is a cause at all in the proper sense of that term. For instance, a man cannot swim without being immersed in a liquid; is, therefore, the liquid the sole cause of his swimming? Is it even the primary cause, or is it properly a cause at all? Is it not rather the condition of the act of swimming? May not physical energy likewise be the condition of certain activity, the direction of which is otherwise de- termined? HTHE presuppositions of some ■*■ scientists, working in limited fields, may lead them to reject this view; the facts of experience as a whole, however, seem to lead in- evitably to the conclusion here suggested. The facts seem to point with certainty to the theory that while physical energy is consumed in human activity, both physical and mental, the direction of that activity may be consciously deter- mined; that persons set up pur- poses to be realized and that they direct and redirect physical energy into activities that bring about realization of these purposes. Is it reasonable to deny these un- Ml .ILTON BENNION, is profes- sor of philosophy and secondary education and dean of the School of Education, University of Utah. He has been a member of the U. of U . faculty at Salt Lake City since 1901 and dean since 1913; was also professor of education at the University of Washington at Seattle, summer sessions 1927, 1928. He was appointed member of the Gen- eral Board of Deseret Sunday School Union in 1909 and member of the Deseret Gymnasium Board since the founding of that institution. He received the degree, Bachelor of Science and Teachers' High School Diploma, University of Utah, 1897; M. A. from Columbia University, 1901 ; has done gradu- ate work also at the University of Chicago, University of Wisconsin, and the. University of California. He went to New Zealand at the age of nineteen and, after three years of missionary work there, visited Australia, Ceylon, Egypt, Palestine, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, Hol- land, Belgium, France, and Eng- land, returning via New York City. (See WHO'S WHO IN AM- ERICA.) doubted facts of experience, or to pronounce them illusions, because they do not harmonize with un- proved presuppositions of any par-' ticular science? Yet that is the point of view of some teachers of science, one of whom in a public lecture recently held that all human conduct must be predetermined in a fixed causal series because other- wise there could be no science of psychology. Does the world exist that there may be a science of psy- chology, or is it possible that this particular psychologist had a wrong notion of science? Is it not the purpose of science to explain the facts of experience rather than dog- matically to assert the universal validity of its own presuppositions. Other sciences, for their particular investigations, may have very dif- ferent presuppositions. In any case, these presuppositions should be limited in their scope and should always be subject to readjustment to fit facts. In themselves they prove nothing, however necessary they may be in any particular in- vestigation. DROFESSOR M. C. Otto, of the ■*■ University of Wisconsin, writes : "In our commendable desire to emulate scientific method we have become more and more obsessed with the notion that no matter what mutilations or distortions might be necessary, everything must be studied as we study chemical reactions or falling bodies. Differences in subject mat- ter might increase our difficulties but must not deviate us from this procedure. And this has been a costly error — how costly there is no way of telling. We do indeed want disciplined intelligence in every field, but disciplined intelligence is not necessar- ily identical with the specialized form it has taken in the physical sciences. This step — the clean-cut recognition that facts determine method, not method facts, that science is for life, not life for science — is of the greatest significance. * * * The theory that men are machines may serve as an illustration. This theory is arrived at by abstracting certain aspects of human behavior and letting these sym- bolize the whole. When this particular view is applied in a circumscribed field not only is there no harm done, but it may prove highly beneficial in various ways: but when, its limitations lost sight of, it becomes the basis of great economic, social and political programs, the damage done is enormous."4 And again, he writes: "Men consciously select certain aspects of their environment and act with delib- erate reference to these aspects. They pass judgments of value upon themselves, other men, and things, and with these as guides, form plans of action aiming at the realiza- tion of particular goods and the avoidance of particular evils. * * * Instead of quietly ignoring these features of hu- man behavior or going to any length of twisting and warping to force them into the conceptual scheme adapted to the be- havior of atoms and molecules, we may develop other conceptual schemes more hospitable to the facts, and so doing, may give a new purpose and consequence to the study of these processes."5 Speaking further of such an in- vestigator, Dr. Otto says: "In that high sense he will be scientific. And he will agree with William James, that what most men need 'is that their faith should be broken up and ventilated, that the north-west wind of science should get into them and blow their sickliness and barbarism away'. But he will not make reality as pictured by natural science the model for human life."5 Henri Bergson expresses the same thought thus: "We cannot sacrifice experience to the requirements of a system. That is why we reject radical mechanism."1 Things and Ideals, pp. 218-219. Hen- ry Holt S Co., New York. 5Ibid, pp. 221-222. 'Ibid, p. 223 'Creative Evolution, p. 39. The Improvement Era For November, 1929 49 '"TO summarize, the mechanistic, ■*- materialistic conception of the nature of reality is inadequate to explain how the world and man came into being, how development can take place at all, or how pur- pose in any form can be admitted or realized. Yet man is here in this complex world in which purposes, both conscious and un- conscious, are all the time being realized. The intelligence and purposeful activity of man are all the time extending his control over the mechanical forces of nature in the service of his own ends and creative activities. Thus there are numerous concrete examples of minds functioning as creative powers redirecting the mechanical forces of nature toward consciously determined ends. Is not this an indisputable fact of experience? Does not this fact lend support to the theory that the whole of real- ity, including the mechanistic forces of nature, is the expression of mind or minds having creative power and capable of purposeful activity? From this outlook the mechanical forces of nature may be regarded then as the servants, not the masters of mind. They have an important, but a subordinate place in the whole of reality, which may, therefore, be regarded as fun- damentally spiritual, using this term in its broadest philosophical meaning. ~Q UT even science itself is be- coming less mechanistic. The tendency of recent physical science is to discard the older notions of matter as merely extension, and to substitute therefor a dynamic con- ception; that is to identify matter with energy and to regard this energy as having in itself creative power, a conception by no means new in philosophy. Thus even matter, so called, may not be mere- ly mechanical, inert, or wholly predetermined in its activity. As- suming certain facts of nature ex- plained by Sir Isaac Newton by the law of gravitation to be beyond question, these facts are just as well and reasonably accounted for by a very different mode of stating the law. As generally given in physics the law reads: "Every particle of matter in the universe attracts every other particle with a force that varies directly as the product of the masses of the particles and inversely as the square of the distances between them." This statement of the law seems to assume that any particle of mat- ter in the universe has power to exert a force or tends to move every other particle in the universe but has no power of self-motion. This is foundational to the mechanistic- materialistic view of the world or reality. But the law may as well be stated thus: "Every particle of matter in the uni- verse moves itself in a way that can be calculated by the product of the masses of the particles and inversely as the square of the distances between them;" that is, the assumptions of self-mo- tion and creative activity in nature are as consistent with the /acts as is the purely mechanistic assump- tion. In case the fact of uniformity of law in nature is cited as an objection to the assumption of self-motion, it may be answered that there is no reason for assuming that self-motion or self-activity is generally to be identified with arbitrary or unpredictable activity. If this were true it would be very unfortunate for human character, to say nothing of making life as we now experience it impossible. In other words there may be gen- eral uniformity both in nature and in human conduct with self-activ- ity, as well as with external com- pulsion. The creative process, however, in its very nature requires also that there shall be innovations in nature. That innovations do occur is not merely a theory, but an indisputable fact of common observation. This point is bor- dering upon the subject of Free- dom, which is to be dealt with in a subsequent number of this series. '"FHE recent discoveries of Einstein ■*■ indicate that the Law of Gravi- tation is due for re-statement in less mechanical form; while the latest announcements of Millikan's in- vestigations indicate modification of the Law of Conservation of Energy; this in recognition of the creative powers of energies or sub- stances with which physics deals. It should be recognized that the laws of physical science, as we know them, are creations of the intellect of the scientist as a means of explaining the facts of nature, that any such law is properly meant to explain only one aspect of a great complex, and that the law itself is subject to change as the discovery of new facts require such change. This statement is amply supported by the history of science. Science, like other human produc- tions, is neither final nor infallible. Scientific theory, especially, is all the time in course of development. Properly understood and properly used, its utility is beyond question. There is, however, no justification for allowing any scientific theory to become a tyrant over the human intellect. T S it, then, to be assumed that reality is wholly spiritual, or are there two diverse kinds of reality, the material and the spiritual? However this question may be an- swered, it seems evident that reality includes both conscious and uncon- scious activity, but that where consciousness is manifest, it tends to control the unconscious. The process of control is, however, a matter of growth or development, and is manifest in varying degrees. It seems probable, therefore, that there are not two wholly different kinds of reality, but rather that all reality has some measure of self- activity or creative power, but that it is only in its more developed forms, and possibly in reality as a whole, that it attains to the status of self-conscious creative power. My Thoughts on Gazing, on the Grandeur of Bryce Canyon O God! How marvelous are thy creations! Thou hast painted with Thy mighty skill, colors that no human hand can duplicate. The harmonious blending of shades and hues is beyond mortal. With water, wind, and sun, Thou hast carved from the solid rocks temples with grandeur rare and castles in their majesty. Mystic forms of ancient columns and sta- tuary in bold relief are on every side. We gaze on Thy handiwork and feel in its presence overwhelmed with its beauty, and our souls arise and say: O God, who are we that we are privileged to look upon this glorious sight? Thou Master Sculptor and di- vine painter, Thou Father of us all! —Mrs. W. H. Richards, Malad, Idaho.